Arizona came home with its season on the rail after three painful losses in New York, then turned Game 6 of the 2001 World Series into a 15-2 statement against Andy Pettitte and the Yankees. The Diamondbacks needed one win to send the Series to a deciding seventh game, and a clue in Pettitte’s delivery helped set the tone.
Game 6 scoring snapshot
| Inning or result | Diamondbacks | Key moment |
|---|---|---|
| First inning | 1 run | Tony Womack doubled and scored on Danny Bautista’s first-pitch single. |
| Second inning | 3 runs | Matt Williams opened the inning with a single, putting Pettitte in the stretch. |
| Third inning | 8 runs | Pettitte was removed four batters into the inning. |
| Final | 15 runs | Diamondbacks 15, Yankees 2 |
The story inside the clubhouse was that Arizona had identified a tell from Pettitte, the veteran left-hander with a well-earned October reputation. The exact origin of the discovery has blurred over the years, but the hitters were convinced they had something before first pitch.
Steve Finley recalled receiving a call the day before the game from someone connected to another club. He could not remember the caller, but said the message sent him straight to the video room. There, Finley said, Arizona found indicators for Pettitte’s fastball, cutter and changeup, and he made sure the lineup saw the footage.
Mark Grace remembered a different route. Not in Bob Brenly’s starting lineup that night, Grace said left-handed reliever Greg Swindell asked him to study tape of Pettitte’s prior outing against Seattle. Grace’s reaction was immediate: the difference in the delivery looked obvious.
Luis Gonzalez, who would provide the famous Game 7 walk-off hit a night later, remembered only that the club had been tipped off, perhaps by scouts. Brenly believed several people were involved and credited video assistant Jim Currigan for doing the work to confirm it.
The stretch became the giveaway
The tell appeared when Pettitte pitched from the stretch. He brought his throwing hand toward the glove beneath his chin. A slight outward movement of the glove as it came down indicated a fastball; a smoother descent meant cutter or changeup.
That made the first assignment simple: get a runner aboard. Pettitte used the windup with the bases empty, leaving Arizona without the same read until someone reached. Grace said the club went to Womack with a direct charge to get on base immediately.
Womack was not interested in studying signals himself. He said he preferred not to know the incoming pitch, even if other hitters could use that information. His job was simply to reach, and he did it with a leadoff double.
Bautista followed by driving Womack home on the first offering he saw. When Williams singled to begin the second, Pettitte had to work from the stretch again, and Arizona piled up three runs. The third inning became the knockout blow, with eight more runs and Pettitte gone before the frame was fully underway.
Pettitte sensed the oddness by the following day. He said he had not felt as crisp as in his previous start, but was stunned by Arizona’s ability to foul off pitches and square up others. Being knocked out so quickly, he said, came as a shock.
Knowing what might be coming did not automatically make a hitter successful. Earlier that season, Tim Hudson had been tipping pitches against Arizona and still held the Diamondbacks to one run in a complete game. Gonzalez understood that distinction. There was no promise attached to a tell, he said, but on this November night, Arizona made it count.
